Obrigheim Nuclear Power Plant – Licensing procedure on decommissioning and dismantling

To prepare a statement under federal supervision on the draft of the licence notification for the Obrigheim NPP (KWO) of EnBW Kernkraft GmbH, 1st decommissioning and dismantling licence (1. SG KWO), BMU requested SSK to discuss and evaluate the nuclear licensing procedure.

In the SSK discussions it was examined whether the requirements set out in the provisions of § 6 StrlSchV are complied with and the state of the art of science and technology has been taken into account in the design and the measures taken. In particular it was examined

• Whether operational radiation protection complies with the requirements set out in the provisions of the StrlSchV,
• Whether the possible radiological effects in normal operation and in case of incidents comply with the requirements set out in the provisions of §§ 46, 47, and 50 StrlSchV, and
• Whether the measures taken on emission and immission monitoring comply with the requirements of the Directive on Emission and Immission Monitoring of Nuclear Facilities.

Release was not subject of the application and was, thus, not included in the expertise. Irrespective of this, the statement points out a contradiction in the application documents.

The SSK discussions resulted in some indications relating to the 1st SG KWO and to the subsequent dismantling steps, which are mentioned and accounted for in the SSK statement.

The potential radiation exposures to the reference persons caused by the discharges of radioactive substances via exhaust air and waste water applied for are sufficiently below the limits of the provisions of § 47 StrlSchV.

With respect to radiological occupational health and safety, SSK considers the provisions concerning the monitoring and planning of works reasonable and appropriate. However, taking into account the experiences gained in other decommissioning projects where the planning value for the annual collective dose is generally 1 Sv, SSK points out that it considers the annual collective dose of 2 Sv given in the status/safety report too high, irrespective of the dismantling step. Taking into account the success of system decontamination and the application of ALARA concepts, SSK expects that this value is clearly fallen below.

As regards the evaluated incident spectrum, all possible incidents have been considered comprehensively. The results show that the dose value for the effective dose according to § 50 StrlSchV in connection with § 117 para. 18 StrlSchV is clearly fallen below for the radiologically representative incidents.